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The  combination  of  rampant  inflation  and  dis- 
tressingly  high  unemployment  over  the  last  few 
years  represents  the  worst  conjuncture  of  eco- 
nomic  events  since  the  Great  Depression  of  the 
1930’s.  These  events  have  brought  severe  distress 
to  many  individuals  and  organizations  and 
shaken  the  foundations  of  some  economic  and  fi- 
nancial  institutions  that  were  thought  to  be  in- 
vulnerable.  They  have  also  shaken  the  confidence 
of  the  economics  profession  and  caused  many 
economists  to  question  some  of  the  basic  premises 
of  economic  stabilization  theory.  One  of  the 
long-time  practitioners  of  the  “dismal  science” 
recently  summed  up  the  feelings  of  many  of  his 
professional  colleagues  when  he  woefully  com- 
mented  that  “The  old  rules  no  longer  apply.” 
Reflecting  this  attitude,  some  economists  are 
calling  for  a  re-examination  of  stabilization 
theory  and  for  new  approaches  to  economic  sta- 
bilization  policy. 
This  widespread  confusion  and  self-doubt  are 
of  rather  recent  origin.  Only  a  little  more  than  a 
de;ade  ago  economists  seemed  supremely  confi- 
dent  of  their  ability  to  control  the  level  of  eco- 
nomic  activity  and  to  achieve  a  nice  balance 
among  the  objectives  of  economic  growth,  high- 
level  employment,  and  price  stability.  With  an 
extraordinary  degree  of  confidence,  practitioners 
of  what  became  known  as  the  “New  Economics” 
spoke  of  their  ability  to  “fine  tune”  the  economy. 
The  Econo~nic  Report  of  the  President  transmitted 
to  the  Congress  in  January  1965,  for  example, 
noted  that  in  the  effort  to  achieve  balanced 
growth  in  the  year  ahead  “Fiscal  and  monetary 
policies  must  be  continuously  adjusted  to  keep 
the  aggregate  demand  for  goods  and  services  in 
line  with  the  economy’s  growing  capacity  to  pro- 
duce  them.”  One  can  picture  a  group  of  econo- 
mists,  seated  before  a  huge  console,  feverishly 
twisting  dials  in  order  to  achieve  just  the  right 
mix  of  policies  that  will  produce  the  optimum 
combination  of  economic  results. 
It  should  be  noted  at  this  point  that  while  the 
questioning  of  basic  premises  is  rather  wide- 
spread,  it  is  by  no  means  unanimous.  Indeed  a 
number  of  economists  would  question  the  propo- 
sition  that  there  has  been  any  change  in  the  eco- 
nomic  fundamentals,  and  they  would  deny  that 
there  is  anything  approaching  a  crisis  in  stabili- 
zation  policy.  The  old  rules  have  not  changed, 
they  say,  and  all  we  have  to  do  is  return  to  the 
old-time  religion.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  a 
few  economists  who  contend  that  the  entire  body 
of  contemporary  economic  theory  is  without  sub- 
stance  and  largely  irrelevant.  But  there  are  a 
great  many  economists  who  have  been  sorely 
troubled  by  the  events  of  recent  years  and  who 
fear  that  important  institutional  changes  over  the 
last  several  decades  have  altered  the  way  the  econ- 
omy  responds  to  traditional  stabilization  actions. 
More  importantly,  perhaps,  the  unfortunate  com- 
bination  of  strong  inflation  and  high  unemploy- 
ment  has  caused  an  important  segment  of  the 
American  public  to  question  the  efficacy  of  our 
economic  system  and  even  our  form  of  govern- 
ment. 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  review,  briefly 
and  in  a  nontechnical  fashion,  the  historical  de- 
velopment  of  stabilization  theories  and  to  de- 
scribe  the  recent  developments  that  have  caused 
some  economists  to  begin  to  reevaluate  these 
theories. 
The  Classical  Period  Prior  to  the  Great  Depres- 
sion  of  the  1930’s,  the  majority  of  economists 
were  not  much  concerned  with  what  we  would 
call  stabilization  theory  and  policy.  The  so-called 
classical  and  neoclassical  school  of  economic 
thought  was  dominant  throughout  the  century 
and  a  half  between  the  publication  of  Adam 
Smith’s  Wealth  of  Nations  and  the  economic  col- 
lapse  of  the  early  1930’s.  There  was  a  gradual 
growth  and  refinement  of  the  basic  body  of  eco- 
nomic  thought  over  this  period,  and,  of  course,  at 
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found  in  the  thinking  of  the  individuals  compris- 
ing  the  classical  school.  Thus,  it  is  difficult  to 
summarize  in  a  few  brief  paragraphs  the  thinking 
of  this  large  and  impartant  group  of  economists 
without  doing  injustice  to  individual  members  of 
the  group.  Nevertheless,  most  of  the  members 
of  the  classical  school  adhered  to  certain  basic 
principles,  and  it  may  be  possible  to  describe 
those  aspects  of  the  classical  system  that  were 
relevant  to  the  question  of  economic  stabilization. 
The  classical  and  neoclassical  economists  be- 
lieved  the  economy  was  inherently  self-stabiliz- 
ing.  A  basic  feature  of  their  system  was  the 
concept  of  long-run  full-employment  equilibrium 
toward  which  the  economy  tended  to  move.  From 
time  to  time  exogenous  shocks  would  disturb  the 
basic  equilibrium  of  the  system,  but  there  were 
powerful  forces,  operating  through  the  market 
system,  to  return  it  to  a  new  equilibrium.  Prices. 
wages,  and  interest  rates  were  generally  assumed 
to  be  highly  flexible  in  response  to  changes  in 
supply  or  demand,  although  some  of  these  econo- 
mists  recognized  the  possibility  of  problems  aris- 
ing  from  sticky  prices  or  xvages. 
In  a  system  possessing  these  characteristics. 
unemploymelit  of  resources  would  be  only  a  tran- 
sitional  phenomenon,  at  worst.  Flexible  interest 
rates  would  tend  to  equate  savings  and  invest- 
ment  at  the  full-employment  level,  and  flexible 
prices  and  wages  would  insure  that  markets  for 
goods  and  labor  would  be  cleared.  Beyond  tem- 
porary  transitional  periods,  changes  in  aggregate 
demand  for  goods  and  services  would  not  affect 
the  level  of  output  and  employment;  they  only 
changed  the  general  price  level.  An  increase  in 
aggregate  demand  at  a  pace  faster  than  the 
growth  in  procluctive  capacity  would  simply  raise 
the  levels  of  prices.  A  fall  in  aggregate  demand 
would  not  cause  unemployment  ;  it  would  merely 
reduce  prices  and  wages. 
Even  the  most  orthodox  of  the  classical  econo- 
mists  recognized  the  obvious  fact  that  in  the  real 
world  depressions  and  inflation  did  occur,  and 
that  from  time  to  time  aggregate  demand  might 
be  inadequate  to  insure  full  employment.  These 
rather  frequent  periods  of  depression  were  usu- 
ally  considered  to  be  the  result  of  temporary 
disturbances  of  markets  caused  by  such  things  as 
speculative  escesses,  a  general  loss  of  confidence, 
an  abnormal  contraction  of  credit,  or  a  sharp 
decline  in  the  money  stock.  In  the  longer  run, 
the  classicists  believed,  powerful  forces  were  at 
work  to  restore  full-employment  equilibrium.  The 
unemployment  that  accompanied  depressions  was 
considered  to  be  one  of  two  types:  It  might  ‘be 
frictional  unemployment  caused  by  people  chang- 
ing  jobs,  ignorance  of  job  opportunities  on  the 
part  of  workers,  or  some  other  temporary  imper- 
fection  in  the  labor  market.  Or  it  could  be  caused 
by  collusion  on  the  part  of  labor  in  a  stubborn 
refusal  to  accept  employment  at  a  wage  equal  to 
their  marginal  productivity.  Unemployment  of 
the  latter  type  was  considered  “voluntary.”  Some 
orthodox  economists  even  described  the  massive 
unemployment  of  the  1930’s  in  these  terms. 
It  is  clear  from  the  foregoing  that  government 
stabilization  policies  played  no  role  in  the  classi- 
cal  scheme  of  things.  Indeed,  the  doctrine  of 
Z&see-faire,  one  that  called  for  a  minimum  of  gov- 
ernment  intervention  in  the  economic  affairs  of 
the  nation,  was  the  dominant  philosophy  during 
this  period.  The  classical  writers  would  have 
considered  government  intervention  not  only  a 
threat  to  individual  freedom,  but  also  a  destabi- 
lizing-  force  in  the  economy.  The  strength  of  the 
laissez-faire  philosophy  is  indicated  by  the  fact  t:hat 
Herbert  Hoover  was  the  first  American  Presi- 
dent  to  attempt  to  use  the  powers  of  the  central 
government  to  alleviate  the  harmful  effects  of  a 
depression. 
It  would  be  a  serious  mistake  to  conclude,  how- 
ever,  that  the  classical  and  neoclassical  doctrine 
went  unchalleng-ed  from  the  days  of  Adam  Smith 
to  the  Great  Depression  of  the  1930’s.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  critics  abounded  from  the  earliest  days  of 
the  period.  Some  of  these,  working  within  the 
great  mainstream  of  classical  thought,  contrib- 
uted  to  the  growth  and  evolution  of  this  school  of 
thought.  Others  attacked  the  classical  doctrine 
from  without.  In  addition,  Wicksell  and  some  of 
lhe  other  great  continental  economists  were  pur- 
suing  quite  different  approaches  to  economic 
analysis,  and  in  the  United  States  Veblen,  Com- 
mons,  Mitchell,  and  the  other  institutionalists 
\Yere  questioning  all  economic  theory. 
As  time  event  on,  the  orthodox  economic  theory 
seemed  to  conform  less  and  less  to  economic 
reality,  and  efforts  to  construct  an  alternative  in- 
creased.  As  Hansen  notes,  this  activity  became 
especially  strong  following  the  turn  of  the  pres- 
ent  century,  particularly  among  the  economists 
1~110 began  their  professional  lives  in  the  period 
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related  to  the  problem  of  economic  fluctuations, 
and  there  were  many  attempts  to  refute  the  cen- 
tral  tenet  of  neoclassical  analysis,  the  premise 
that  there  is  a  basic  tendency  for  the  economy  to 
move  automatically  toward  full  employment.  But 
the  problem  faced  by  these  economists  was  that 
“You  can’t  beat  something  with  nothing.”  Critics 
of  the  classical  system  had  no  generally  accept- 
able  body  of  theory  to  take  its  place.  Even  some 
of  the  more  effective  dissenters,  such  as  J.  M. 
Clark,  continued  to  use  the  classical  analysis. 
The  Keynesian  Revolution  An  alternative  theo- 
retical  approach  was  provided  in  1936  with  the 
publication  of  a  book  by  the  English  economist, 
John  Maynard  Keynes.  His  General  Theory  of 
Employnzent,  Interest  and  &foney  is  a  rather  poorly 
written  and  sometimes  confusing  book,  but  with  the 
exception  of  Marx’s  Das  Kapital  it  was  perhaps  the 
most  influential  book  on  economics  since  Adam 
Smith. 
Keynes  attacked  head-on  the  central  tenet  of 
the  classical  theory,  i.e.,  the  tendency  of  the  econ- 
omy  to  move  constantly  toward  a  condition  of 
full-employment  equilibrium.  As  expounded  by  a 
leading  classicist  of  that  day,  A.  C.  Pigou,  this 
tendency  toward  full  employment  rested  on  two 
conditions:  (1)  flexible  interest  rates  would  in- 
sure  full  use  of  resources  by  equating  saving  and 
investment,  and  (2)  flexible  wage  rates  would 
ensure  full  employment,  regardless  of  the  level  of 
total  demand. 
Keynes  contended  that  both  of  these  principles 
were  fallacious.  Saving  and  investment  are  two 
entirely  separate  processes  and  are  not  mutually 
determined  by  any  single  variable,  such  as  the 
interest  rate.  Saving,  he  said,  is  determined  by 
the  level  of  income;  the  level  of  investment  de- 
pends  on  the  relationship  between  the  rate  of 
interest  and  the  return  on  investment.  If  planned 
investment  fell  short  of  the  level  of  saving  at  full 
employment,  realized  saving  and  investment 
would  be  equalized  through  a  fall  in  income  (and 
saving).  It  is  possible,  therefore,  for  equilibrium 
to  be  attained  at  a  level  of  income  below  full  em- 
ployment.  Flexible  wages,  even  if  they  existed, 
would  not  ensure  full  employment.  A  fall  in 
money  wages  would  reduce  consumption  outlays 
and  thus  reduce  total  demand  for  goods  and  ser- 
1 Alvin  H.  Hansen,  A  Guide  to  Keynes  (New  York:  McGraw-Hill 
Book  Company,  Inc.,  1953).  PP.  4-11. 
vices.  The  lower  level  of  demand  for  goods  and 
services  would  lower  the  derived  demand  for 
labor  and  therefore  would  not  eliminate  unem- 
ployment. 
It  is  not  our  purpose  here  to  discuss  the  details 
of  the  Keynesian  system.  This  has  been  done 
many  times  over  the  last  forty  years,  and  in  the 
process  many  features  of  the  system  have  been 
changed  and  some  that  Keynes  considered  im- 
portant  have  been  ignored.  But  the  importance 
of  the  General  Theory  is  that  it  focused  attention  on 
the  level  of  aggregate  demand  as  the  determinant 
of  the  level  of  output  and  employment.  More- 
over,  it  provided  theoretical  justification  for  the 
use  of  governmental  actions  to  influence  employ- 
ment  and  prices  by  manipulating  total  demand. 
Fiscal  policy  was  justified  on  the  grounds  that 
government  spending  is  an  important  element 
of  aggregate  demand,  while  changes  in  taxes 
affect  the  private  components  of  demand.  Mone- 
tary  policy  could  affect  the  investment  compo- 
nent  of  demand  by  changing  the  level  of  interest 
rates. 
If  one  accepts  the  idea  that  the  economy  does 
not  move  automatically  toward  full-employment 
equilibrium  (indeed  that  equilibrium  at  less  than 
full  employment  is  quite  possible)  and  that  the 
government  possesses  the  power  to  determine  the 
level  of  employment  and  prices,  then  the  exercise 
of  that  power  becomes  inevitable.  And  this  is 
what  happened  in  the  years  following  the  publi- 
cation  of  the  General  Theory.  Keynes’s  emphasis  on 
the  use  of  fiscal  policy  received  an  important 
boost  when  government  spending  during  World 
War  II  wiped  out  the  heavy  unemployment  that 
had  persisted  throughout  the  1930’s  and  the  gov- 
ernment  commitment  to  stabilization  policy  was 
officially  recognized  in  the  Employment  Act  of 
1946. 
The  Phillips  Curve  Many  early  Keynesians 
seemed  to  think  of  the  “full-employment”  level  of 
aggregate  demand  as  a  relatively  narrow  range. 
At  most  points  below  full  employment,  a  change 
in  the  level  of  aggregate  demand  would  change 
employment  with  little  or  no  effect  on  prices.  At 
points  above  the  full  employment  level,  a  change 
in  aggregate  demand  would  change  prices  with 
little  or  no  effect  on  employment.  As  time  passed, 
however,  economists  generally  came  to  perceive 
the  “stabilization  band”  as  comprising  a  rather 
wide  range,  and  this  view  received  theoretical 
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support  with  the  publication  of  a  paper  in  19% 
by  the  British  economist  A.  W.  Phillips.’  Ap- 
plying  statistical  analysis  to  wage  and  unem- 
ployment  data  for  the  years  between  1861  and 
1913,  Phillips  discovered  an  inverse  relationship 
between  these  two  variables.  That  is,  there  was 
a  tendency  for  the  rate  of  increase  in  wages  to  be 
high  in  periods  when  unemployment  was  low, 
and  vice  versa.  These  somewhat  unsurprising 
findings  became  embodied  in  what  was  called 
the  “Phillips  curve.” 
Although  expressing  an  unspectacular  and 
rather  commonsense  idea,  the  Phillips  curve  was 
of  considerable  importance  in  the  evolution  of 
stabilization  policy.  Since  the  rate  of  change  of 
prices  is  closely  related  to  the  rate  of  change  of 
wages,  the  Phillips  curve  provided  intellectual 
underpinning  for  the  concept  of  a  trade  off  be- 
tween  inflation  and  unemployment.  The  policy- 
maker  was  given  a  choice  over  a  wide  range  of 
combinations  of  unemployment  and  inflation.  Be- 
cause  of  the  shape  of  the  curve  (see  Chart  l),  the 
higher  the  rate  of  unemployment,  the  lower 
would  be  the  cost  in  terms  of  additional  inflation 
of  reducing  the  unemployment  rate;  conversely, 
the  higher  the  rate  of  inflation,  the  less  would  be 
the  cost  in  terms  of  additional  unemployment  of 
policies  designed  to  restrain  inflation.  The  role 
of  the  policymaker,  therefore,  was  to  choose  the 
?A.  W.  Phillips,  “The  Relation  Between  Unemployment  and  the 
Rate  of  Change  of  Money  Wage  Rates  in  the  United  Kinadorn. 
1861-1957,”  Economica.  Vol.  25.  No.  100  (November  1958).  285. 
“optimum”  combination  of  unemployment  and 
inflation  given  the  Phillips  curve  confronting 
him.  The  actual  choice,  of  course,  would  be  a 
reflection  of  the  values  of  the  policymaker  and, 
perhaps,  important  political  considerations. 
Something  similar  to  the  Phillips  curve  analy- 
sis  has  probably  been  the  basis  of  economic  sta- 
bilization  policy  since  World  War  II,  but  it  was 
not  until  the  early  1960’s  that  it  received  its  most 
explicit  statement  as  a  guide  to  stabilization 
policy,  In  the  Econonzic  Report  of  the  President 
transmitted  to  Congress  in  January  1962,  a  4  per- 
cent  unemployment  rate  was  adopted  as  a  “tem- 
porary”  target.  In  a  later  discussion  of  this  goal, 
a  member  of  the  President’s  Council  of  Economic 
Advisers  in  1961  stated,  “Four  percent  w:as 
chosen  with  an  eye  on  the  Phillips  curve,  spe- 
cifically  the  4  percent  inflation  that  accompanied 
4  percent  unemployment  in  the  mid-1950’s.“3 
Recent  Developments  The  concept  of  some  sort 
of  trade  off  between  inflation  and  unemployment 
continues  to  play  an  important  role  in  economic 
stabilization  policy,  but  in  recent  years  this  idea 
has  come  increasingly  into  question.  First  of  all, 
Phillips’  work  has  been  subjected  to  searching 
criticism  with  respect  to  theoretical  and  method- 
ological  considerations.4  But  more  importantly 
from  the  viewpoint  of  practical  policy,  it  has  be- 
come  more  and  more  difficult  to  reconcile  the 
recent  behavior  of  prices  and  unemployment  with 
the  idea  of  a  smooth  trade  off  between  the  two. 
As  one  economist  notes  “.  .  .  there  is  as  yet  no 
convincing  way  of  fitting  the  phenomenon  of 
stagflation  into  the  framework  of  post-Keynesian 
economics.“6 
A  number  of  explanations  have  been  advan’ced 
as  to  why  the  postulated  trade  off  between  in- 
flation  and  unemployment  may  no  longer  be 
valid.  One  school  of  thought  explains  this  in 
terms  of  the  formation  of  expectations.  Accord- 
ing  to  this  theory,  expectations  of  future  price 
behavior  are  formed  on  the  basis  of  past  price 
experience.  If,  following  a  period  of  price  sta- 
bility,  the  economy  expands  rapidly,  wages  may 
3 James  Tobin,  The  New  Economics  One  Decade  Later  (Princeton: 
Princeton  University  Press,  1972),  pp.  16-17. 
4 See,  for  example.  M.  Desai,  “The  Phillips  Curve:  A  Revisionist 
Igpretatlon,”  Economica.  Vol.  42.  No.  165  (February  X975). 
j Hendrik  S.  Houthakker,  “Incomes  Policies  as  a  Supplementary 
Tool,”  in  Answers  to  lnflatim  and  Recession:  Economic  Policies 
for  a  Modern  Society.  ed.  by  Albert  T.  Sommers  (New  York:  The 
Conference  Board.  1975).  p.  73. 
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“natural”  rate.  Prices  will  begin  to  rise,  and  the 
price  expectations  of  workers  and  businessmen 
will  be  disappointed.  As  the  inflation  continues, 
people’s  expectations  will  be  revised;  and  this 
results  in  an  upward  shift  in  the  Phillips  curve,  so 
that  each  rate  of  unemployment  is  now  associated 
with  a  higher  rate  of  inflation.  For  any  given 
rate  of  inflation,  unemployment  will  gradually 
rise  back  to  the  natural  level,  and  the  temporary 
stimulative  effect  of  inflation  will  vanish.  In  the 
long  run,  unemployment  will  return  to  its  equi- 
librium  level,  and  the  inflation  rate  will  stabilize. 
An  attempt  to  halt  the  inflation  by  reducing 
aggregate  demand  will  initially  cause  a  rise  in 
unemployment.  But  persistent  expectations  of 
inflation  may  cause  the  Phillips  curve  to  con- 
tinue  to  shift  to  the  right,  and  the  response  of 
inflation  to  a  reduction  in  aggregate  demand  ma) 
be  excruciatingly  slow. 
Another  approach  explains  the  recent  “stag- 
flation”  in  terms  of  institutional  characteristics 
of  product  and  labor  markets.  Okun,  for  ex- 
ample,  distinguishes  between  what  he  calls  “cus- 
tomer”  product  markets  and  “career”  labor  mar- 
kets,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  “auction”  markets 
postulated  in  traditional  economic  analysis  on  the 
other.6  In  customer  product  markets,  prices  do 
not  equate  supply  and  demand.  For  most  prod- 
ucts,  the  price  is  set  by  the  seller  and  the  quantity 
sold  is  determined  by  demand  conditions  in  the 
market,  but  the  -price  is  not  established  in  the 
expectation  of  clearing  the  market.  Because 
shopping  is  costly  and  bothersome,  a  continuing 
relationship  is  usually  established  between  the 
customer  and  the  supplier.  In  a  similar  fashion, 
long-term  employer-employee  relationships  are 
established  in  labor  markets.  A  firm’s  wage  rates 
(and  number  of  employees)  may  be  influenced 
very  little  by  short-run  changes  in  demand,  and 
Okun  emphasizes  the  concept  of  “fairness”  in  the 
determination  of  long-run  wage  levels.  Fairness 
in  this  case  is  defined  in  terms  of  the  relationship 
of  the  firm’s  wage  structure  to  other  wages,  or  to 
the  price  of  the  firm’s  product,  or  to  the  workers’ 
cost  of  living.  According  to  this  approach,  the 
appearance  of  excess  demand  will  first  be  re- 
flected  in  a  rise  in  prices  in  the  “auction”  markets 
and  will  then  spread  to  customer  product  markets 
“Arthur  M.  Okun.  “Inflation:  Its  Mechanics  and  Welfare  Costs,” 
Bmokings  Papen  on  Economic  Activity.  No.  2  (1975),  pp.  351-90. 
and  career  labor  markets  only  with  a  lag.  Be- 
cause  of  the  stickiness  of  many  wages  and  prices, 
inflation  is  slow  getting  started  but  it  tends  to 
gather  momentum  as  it  progresses,  and  wages 
and  prices  may  continue  to  increase,  with  an  ad- 
verse  impact  on  employment,  long  after  excess 
demand  is  removed. 
These  two  explanations  of  the  recent  insta- 
bility  of  the  Phillips  curve  are  not  mutually  ex- 
clusive,  of  course,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that 
both  help  to  explain  the  recent  failure  of  prices 
and  unemployment  to  conform  to  the  expected 
Phillips  curve  configuration.  One  of  the  weak- 
nesses  of  the  expectations  approach,  perhaps,  is 
that  it  puts  too  little  emphasis  on  the  institu- 
tional  aspects  of  the  problem.  The  fact  is,  most 
prices  and  wages  in  our  economy  are  not  deter- 
mined  in  the  manner  described  in  many  eco- 
nomics  textbooks.  Producers  of  a  great  many 
products  do  not  think  of  themselves  as  facing 
some  market-determined  price,  and  indeed  they 
are  not.  They  set  their  own  prices,  and  the  most 
important  determinant  of  any  price  is  the  pro- 
ducer’s  estimate  of  current  unit  costs  and  antici- 
pated  future  changes  in  costs.  Wages  of  a  great 
many  workers  are  the  result  of  a  collective  bar- 
gaining  process  where  the  most  important  factors 
are  the  relative  bargaining  powers  of  the  partici- 
pants.  As  Okun  notes,  however,  wages  in  other 
firms  and  industries,  the  firm’s  profit  picture, 
and  changes  in  the  workers’  costs  of  living  are 
important  considerations.  Moreover,  prices  of 
most  products  are  not  changed  very  often,  while 
wage  contracts  often  cover  a  period  of  several 
years. 
Implications  for  Policy  All  of  this  has  important 
implications  for  the  conduct  of  stabilization 
policy,  but  just  as  there  is  no  general  agreement 
on  the  basic  cause  of  the  problem,  there  also  is 
no  agreement  on  the  proper  direction  of  policy  in 
the  kind  of  situation  that  prevails  today.  Those 
who  attribute  all  of  the  instability  of  the  Phillips 
curve  to  expectations  of  inflation  believe  that  all 
that  is  needed  to  achieve  price  stability  is  to 
eliminate  inflationary  expectations  and  gradually 
to  move  unemployment  back  to  the  “natural” 
rate.  For  many  of  the  economists  emphasizing 
expectations,  inflation  is  always  and  only  a  mone- 
tary  phenomenon,  and  the  most  important  factor 
in  the  control  of  inflation  is  the  proper  use  of 
tnonetary  policy  to  prevent  it  from  getting 
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tionary  expectations  are  firmly  embedded  in  the 
minds  of  businessmen  and  consumers,  the  only 
way  to  deal  with  it  is  to  hold  aggregate  demand 
below  the  full-employment  level  until  these  ex- 
pectations  are  eliminated.  And  because  of  the 
manner  in  which  expectations  are  formed,  this 
can  be  done  only  over  an  extended  period  of  time. 
In  a  period  like  the  present,  those  who  stress  the 
expectations  factor  would  caution  against  an 
attempt  to  achieve  a  rapid  recovery  because  of 
fears  of  creating  new  inflationary  expectations. 
Many  economists  acknowledge  the  importance 
of  expectations  in  prolonging  and  strengthening 
the  inflationary  process,  but  they  argue  that  in- 
stitutional  factors  also  play  a  role.  They  believe 
that  fundamental  changes  in  our  society,  our 
economy,  and  in  the  role  of  government  have 
seriously  weakened  the  traditional  stabilization 
techniques  insofar  as  the  control  of  inflation  is 
concerned.’  Some  of  these  changes  have  helped 
to  create  an  inflationary  bias  in  our  economy, 
while  others  have  reduced  the  effectiveness  of 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy  in  controlling  infla- 
tion.  Foremost  among  these  changes  would  be 
the  decline  in  price  competition  in  both  product 
and  labor  markets.  This,  of  course,  has  weakened 
the  link  between  monetary  and  fiscal  actions,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  prices  and  wages,  on  the  other. 
In  addition,  welfare  programs  and  income  main- 
tenance  policies  of  government  and  private  in- 
dustry  have  reduced  the  incentive  for  workers  to 
search  diligently  for  employment  or  to  accept 
employment  at  a  reduced  wage.  At  the  same 
time,  minimum  wage  laws  contribute  to  the  in- 
exorable  rise  in  wage  rates  and,  some  believe, 
they  may  price  many  unskilled  workers  out  of 
the  labor  market,  thereby  aggravating  the  unem- 
ployment  problem.  Regulatory  policies  of  gov- 
ernmental  agencies  sometimes  make  price  compe- 
tition  in  the  regulated  industry  impossible  and 
contribute  significantly  to  the  downward  inflexi- 
bility  of  prices. 
Finally,  our  economy  has  become  increasingly 
subject  to  influences  originating  outside  our 
own  borders.  The  elimination  of  barriers  to 
international  trade  and  financial  flows  over  the 
last  two  decades  has  served  to  tie  our  economy 
‘See,  for  example,  an  address  by  Arthur  F.  Burns.  “The  Real 
Issues  of  Inflation  and  Unem~b~ment,”  delivered at  the  University 
of  Georgia,  September  19.  1975. 
much  more  closely  to  economies  abroad,  with 
the  result  that  economic  developments  in  for 
eign  lands  may  have  an  important  impact  01) 
conditions  in  our  economy.  Some  believe,  for 
example,  that  the  worldwide  economic  boom  oi 
the  early  1970’s,  coupled  with  crop  failure:5 
abroad,  the  temporary  disappearance  of  the  an- 
chovies  off  the  coast  of  Peru,  and  the  sharp  de- 
valuation  of  the  U.  S.  dollar,  contributed  greatl)- 
to  the  inflation  experienced  in  the  United  States. 
These  developments  were  followed  by  the  sharp 
boost  in  energy  prices  imposed  by  the  OPEC 
cartel,  an  illustration  of  our  growing  dependence 
on  foreign  sources  of  fuel  and  raw  materials. 
Some,  but  by  no  means  all,  of  those  economists 
who  emphasize  institutional  factors  and  market 
imperfections  advocate  some  kind  of  incomes 
policy.  These  proposals  range  from  guideposts 
and  jawboning,  to  control  of  certain  basic  ma- 
terials  prices,  to  full-scale  wage,  price,  and  profit 
controls.  Some  advocate  temporary  use  of  these 
powers  during  periods  of  inflation  on  the  ground 
that  their  use  would  speed  the  adjustment  Iof 
price  expectations.  Others  advocate  a  permanent 
system  of  controls  on  the  ground  that  it  is  needed 
to  offset  the  market  power  of  large  corporations 
and  labor  unions.  A  great  many  economists  ques- 
tion  the  efficacy  of  permanent,  full-scale  wage 
and  price  controls.  Such  controls,  they  argue, 
would  seriously  distort  the  functioning  of  the 
economy  and  lead  to  the  inefficient  allocation  of 
resources.  Some  are  skeptical  of  temporary  con- 
trols  on  the  ground  that  they  are  ineffective. 
Economists  of  all  persuasions  favor  some  type 
of  “structural”  reform  that  would  eliminate  many 
of  the  institutional  features  that  contribute  to 
the  inflationary  bias  in  the  economy  or  tend  to 
reduce  the  response  of  wages  and  prices  to  tra- 
ditional  stabilization  policies.  But  not  surpris- 
ingly,  there  is  little  agreement  on  the  specific  list 
of  items  to  be  included  in  these  reforms.  A  great 
many  of  the  proposed  reforms  affect  powerful 
vested  interests,  and  the  political  obstacles  to  any 
significant  action  in  this  area  are  formidable. 
Conclusion  Recent  experience  clearly  indicates 
the  need  for  a  serious  reappraisal  of  our  approach 
to  economic  stabilization  policy.  Such  a  reap- 
praisal  should  recognize  first  that  the  problems 
we  have  had  do  not  call  for  a  scrapping  of  tra- 
ditional  stabilization  tools.  Indeed,  some  would 
s  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  MARCH/APRIL  1976 say  that  most  of  our  recent  problems  resulted 
from  ineptitude  in  the  use  of  these  traditional 
tools.  But  demand  management  is  still  necessary 
because  inadequate  demand  can  cause  unemploy- 
ment  and  excess  demand  can  create  or  exacerbate 
inflation.  At  the  same  time,  the  limitations  of 
these  tools  should  be  recognized.  They  are  pri- 
marily  effective  in  dealing  with  economic  insta- 
bility  arising  from  an  excess  or  deficiency  of 
aggregate  demand.  They-  are  not  very  effective 
in  dealing  with  price  increases  arising  from  crop 
failure,  the  actions  of  an  oil  cartel,  or  against  the 
cost-push  price  pressures  so  prevalent  in  our 
economy  today.  If  used  to  combat  this  type  oi 
inflation  they  can  be  very  costly,  not  only  in 
terms  of  unemployment  and  lost  output,  but  also 
in  terms  of  a  weakening  of  the  social  and  political 
fabric  of  our  society. 
Efforts  to  control  inflation  and  achieve  an  ac- 
ceptable  level  of  employment  have  not  been  very 
successful  in  recent  years.  This  has  been  partly 
because  of  the  extraordinary  nature  of  some  of 
the  disturbances  that  have  rocked  the  econom> 
and  partly  because  of  the  stubborn  persistence  of 
inflationary  espectations.  In  the  absence  of  other 
approaches  to  economic  stabilization,  perhaps  too 
much  has  been  expected  of  the  traditional  tech- 
niques.  This  seems  to  have  been  particularly  true 
of  monetary  policy.  Some  of  the  more  ardent 
champions  of  monetary  policy  have  claimed  more 
for  that  policy  than  it  can  deliver,  with  the  result 
that  the  central  bank  has  been  subjected  to  a 
great  deal  of  criticism.  Such  exaggerated  claims 
may  seriously  impair  the  ability  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  to  perform  its  traditional  func- 
tions. 
It  may  be  that  the  recent  problems  of  economic 
stabilization  are  a  passing  phenomenon,  but  if 
they  are  not,  new  policy  approaches  may  have  to 
be  developed.  The  most  obvious  first  step  would 
appear  to  be  the  elimination  of  artificial  barriers 
to  competition  in  labor  and  product  markets  and 
the  alteration  of  structural  features  that  reduce 
the  flexibility  of  the  economy.  But  in  order  to 
achieve  a  reasonable  degree  of  economic  stability 
in  the  years  ahead  it  may  be  necessary  to  develop 
new  policy  tools  to  supplement  those  presently 
in  use. 
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